INTRODUCTION
9/11's impact on the observed quantity of air travel can be characterized as an immediate, sharp downturn in the two months following the event, followed by a gradual but incomplete recovery towards the original trend. The relative sizes of both the temporary and permanent aspects of the decline in air travel were estimated by Ito and Lee (2005b) using monthly data (through much of 2003) at the national level. In this chapter we use data that are disaggregated at the airport level to look not only at the impact of September 11th on the quantity of air travel, but also at its composition.
We explore several hypotheses related to the impact of September 11th on the composition of air travel in the United States. First, we ask whether large airports were more affected by 9/11 than small airports. Second, we ask whether New England and Mid-Atlantic destinations were impacted more strongly than destinations in other regions. In future work, we also intend to explore the extent to which (if at all): (1) US origin passengers have shifted away from international and toward domestic travel; and (2) foreign-origin passengers have shifted away from US destinations.
The answers to these questions have implications which extend beyond the relatively narrow scope of air travel, as they touch on the ability of terrorism to bring about short-, medium-and long-run changes in patterns of economic activity. The large airport hypothesis, for example, addresses the broader question of terrorism's impact on the density of economic activity. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) point out two potentially important effects of terrorism on density that would work in opposite directions. On the one hand, the fact that terrorists tend to target high-density areas suggests that an increase in terrorism risk will discourage density. On the other hand, increases in transportation costs brought about by terrorism will tend to encourage density. Recent research provides mixed results on the net impact. Abadie and Dermisi (2006) find evidence that demand for office space in several of Chicago's landmark buildings has fallen since GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11621 -EE -RICHARDSON:M1766 -RICHARDSON TEXT the September 11th attacks. Redfearn (2005) , on the other hand, finds no evidence of reductions in home prices in areas surrounding likely terrorist targets in Los Angeles following the attacks. Together, this work may suggest that while the threat is sufficient to discourage activity in very highdensity central business districts, it is not sufficient to impact the form of the remainder of the urban area.
Additionally, the impact of the terrorist threat on the air travel industry itself is important in its own right. To the extent that terrorism is responsible for increasing the perceived risks of air travel, it results in several unique costs which all contribute to its total economic impact. Resulting increases in security are costly both in terms of the direct costs of funding the security effort and in terms of the longer security delays imposed on travelers. Trips not taken on account of the increased hassle or increased fear of flying also add to the welfare losses. Substitution away from air travel towards alternative modes of transportation (or towards telecommunications) also involves a loss of benefits conferred by air travel.
There are many studies that have documented the effects of 9/11 on air travel. Most recently, Gordon et al. (2007) studied the impact of 9/11 on the aggregate economy by predicting air travel as if 9/11 did not happen, and then comparing the current economic activity with the predicted economic activity. Further, Becker and Rubinstein (2007) use a similar method in their comparison of air travel before and after the attacks. Specifically, they find that air travel fell by about 15 percent and had still not recovered by 2003. The estimates made by Ito and Lee (2005b) suggest a permanent decrease of around 7 percent.
Still other effects changed the behavior of individual travel modes; for instance, Gigerenzer (2006) shows that individuals substituted driving for flying after 9/11. From a personal safety standpoint this was not a good decision. Much of the risk associated with flying is concentrated in take-offs and landings, while the risk associated with driving increases with the number of miles driven. In fact, in order for flying and driving to have the same risk, a 9/11-like attack would have to happen 12 times a year (Sivak and Flannagan, 2003) . Nevertheless, Gigerenzer (2006) shows that an estimated additional 1500 deaths occurred because individuals chose to drive instead of fly.
We suggest that large airports could also be subject to a 'fear factor'. This could cause a shift of passengers from large airports to small airports. Further, business trends in the airline industry could also promote smaller airports. The rise of low-cost carriers with a different business model could decrease the percentage of passengers passing through large airports. Low-cost carriers (LCCs) fly from smaller, less congested airports with fewer travelers and generally cheaper take-off and landing fees. Further, LCCs depart early in the morning or late at night to take advantage of cheaper airport fees. This method also minimizes delays. One other LCC characteristic is the utilization of more point-to-point routes instead of the hub-and-spoke business model. The hub-and-spoke business model tends to utilize large airports. (Travelers are flown to one large airport and then boarded on other flights to their final destinations. In the point-to-point method, travelers are flown directly from their origin to their destination.) Because LCCs use more point-to-point routes, this could have lessened the volume of traffic to large airports. Though we do not test this hypothesis directly, we do include a measure of LCC market share.
Other factors that could increase the appeal of smaller airports come from large airports being nearer to their full capacity. That is, large airports may (both prior to 9/11 and currently) be relatively constrained in their ability to expand, making additional flights and passengers more costly. In addition, the costs imposed on flying by 9/11 (security measures and so on) could be more costly at large airports because of their high volumes of travel both in absolute terms and relative to capacity.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA
This study is meant to estimate the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on patterns of air travel within the United States. We view 9/11 as an exogenous shock to the airline system. We proceed by estimating a variety of models which are designed to parameterize the periods before and after the event. For controls, our focus is on controlling: (1) general economic factors which are relevant to the size of the market for air travel; and (2) pre-existing trends which, if not accounted for, could result in inappropriate characterizations of the pre-and post-event periods. We use state-level economic data to measure 'demand-side' impacts on airport passenger levels. These data are supplemented by time-related factors (primarily time trends and controls for seasonality), special events and, in some specifications, two 'supply-side' factors for which we have national data.
Following Ito and Lee, our quantitative analysis is of the following form:
The following paragraphs describe the variables included in each of the above categories and the data used to account for each of these variables.
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11621 -EE -RICHARDSON:M1766 -RICHARDSON TEXT Our quantity variable is a measure of the number of passenger enplanements in a given month. The data were collected at the airport level using the US Department of Transportation (2008), T-100 databank, henceforth referred to as US DOT, which accounts for all certified US air carriers. Because the data are not readily available from the databank website, we created a computer program using the Python programming language to query the BTS site and retrieve the data.
Our research differs from Ito and Lee (2005b) (henceforth referred to as I&L) in several respects. First, because we are concerned with geographic and airport-level hypotheses, we use disaggregated data. I&L measure quantity using revenue passenger miles at the national level from the Air Transport Association (ATA), which only collects data from some of the largest US airlines. As a robustness check, we ran our regressions using pooled data from the US DOT 100 databank and found similar significance and effect size of 9/11 in the data. See Table 9 .1 for summary statistics of our disaggregated data.
The economic factors include two variables that can be viewed as demand-side variables and, in some specifications, two variables that can be viewed as supply-side variables. The demand-side variables are the unemployment rate (which accounts for the effects of the business cycle) and the level of employment (which is a proxy for the level of economic activity). Both variables are measured using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We collect these data at the state level and, where appropriate, apply state-level unemployment rates and employment levels to each airport within the state. This contrasts with I&L who, again, use nationally aggregated data throughout. As I&L observe, it would be preferable to use gross domestic product (GDP) data to measure the level of economic activity, but GDP is reported on a quarterly, rather than monthly, basis. Most notably, employment-level data will fail to pick up increases in economic activity and incomes due to productivity gains, which were a particular key component of economic growth during the early 2000s. When using the state-level employment data for our disaggregated regressions we typically include a linear time trend to help account for trend productivity growth and other upward-trending factors that may not be accounted for by our other controls. The primary supply-side economic variables used by I&L are: (1) a measure of the share of air travel that is provided by low-cost carriers; and (2) a measure of the price of jet fuel. As I&L note, past studies have identified the emergence of LCCs as possibly the most significant development in the airline industry in recent decades. This variable is, in a sense, a measure of the extent of competition within the industry. Jet fuel prices are naturally important as they constitute a significant input cost in the provision of air travel. We have developed a measure of the LCC share which appears to behave similarly to I&L's in terms of both its summary statistics and its impact on our regression analysis. This measure also uses the US Department of Transportation (2008)'s T-100 databank. It is based on the fraction of passengers in each month who are not attributed to a major carrier. 4 To account for the price of jet fuel, we have also collected monthly data on the spot price of jet fuel in Los Angeles from the Department of Energy's website (in cents per gallon). We have also experimented with the use of other input cost variables such as the Producer Price Index for the production of civilian aircraft and the wages of pilots, airline mechanics and transportation attendants as reported annually in the National Compensation Survey.
The time variables used in our regressions fall into two categories: the traditional seasonality and trends variables, and the additional accounting for calendar irregularities. The intensity of air travel is very clearly affected by seasonality, with holiday and vacation seasons driving the amount of air travel above its yearly mean level. Consequently we include month-dummy variables in all of our regressions. As noted above, there is also reason for concern that our typical proxy for the level of economic activity (the employment level) will fail to account for trend productivity growth, which is a key determinant of incomes and hence demand for air travel. Consequently we include a linear time trend in most of our specifications. 5 We also include dummy variables to account for two specific calendar irregularities. The first is for Februaries during leap years which, since they have an extra day, will be expected to involve a larger volume of passenger travel within that month. The second, perhaps less obvious, source of irregularities is for Novembers and Decembers in years during which the Sunday after Thanksgiving occurs in December. This Sunday typically involves a large volume of air travel, and its irregular inclusion in December would hinder efforts to account fully for seasonality if it were not independently accounted for. Both of these irregularities are accounted for in I&L's previous work. We also include dummy variables for the first Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the SARS epidemic.
6 Finally, we account for September 11th in several ways that differ across specifications. In most of the specifications presented, September 11th is accounted for by two variables. The first is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 in each month prior to September 2001 and a value of 1 in September 2001 and each subsequent month. This variable seeks to identify the size of any permanent shift in the amount of air travel following the terrorist attacks. The second is an effort to account for the post-September 11th shock that proved to be transitory. Before moving on to present our regression analysis and results, a word should be said regarding plausible interpretations of our regression equations.
7 Though we control for various supply and demand factors, we interpret our results as reflecting the impact of various factors on market equilibrium rather than on demand or supply specifically. We think that identifying the impacts of September 11th on market equilibrium is sufficiently interesting to make the claim of identifying shifts in demand unnecessary. Having the luxury of leaving it at this is, perhaps, a benefit of studying the impact of a clearly exogenous event on observed quantities rather than, say, trying to identify the impact of an increase in prices on the quantity demanded.
To model September 11th's impact on demand explicitly, it would be necessary to distinguish between the factors that impact upon supply and demand, perhaps as sketched below:
If input prices truly only belong in the supply equation, then they could feasibly be used as instruments for identifying exogenous price shocks from the perspective of the demand equation. We may pursue this approach in future work, but have not yet had the opportunity to compile price data that are disaggregated at the airport level.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section we discuss and present our regression results. First we summarize the main differences between our data and the data used by I&L. Then we present specifications similar to those used by I&L, but making use of our disaggregated dataset. In subsection C we move on to test the hypothesis that the September 11th terrorist attacks had a more severe impact on passenger traffic at particularly large airports than at smaller airports.
Differences from Ito and Lee's Analysis
Since our basic regression specifications closely follow those of I&L, we begin by highlighting the primary differences between our data and theirs. First, we measure quantity using passenger enplanements while I&L use revenue passenger miles. Second, we use US DOT (2008) data that only go back to 1990 (but that have the benefit of coming in a highly disaggregated format) while I&L use ATA data going back to 1986. Third, the two supply-side variables may not be constructed in the same manner as I&L's, as the descriptions of their data collection was not particularly detailed in these two cases. (Because of uncertainty about the quality of the data used for these two variables more generally, we present most of the specifications in this chapter both with and without these supply-side variables.) Fourth, we define our Iraq War dummy differently, setting it equal to one from March 2003 to the present rather than only setting it equal to one during the 'major combat operations' phase. Finally, we did not collect a measure of airline fatalities, as this variable appears with a coefficient of 0.000 in all of I&L's regressions.
In summary, our attempted replication results are qualitatively similar to I&L's, although there are certainly some notable quantitative differences.
Initial Results using the Disaggregated Data
In this section we briefly present results for regressions that use specifications similar to those of I&L, but which make use of data disaggregated at the airport level. A word should be said about the airports included in the sample. Many airports in the data as initially collected have months in which they either do not report a number of passengers or report zero passengers. Many other airports report very small numbers of passengers, and these smaller airports tend to experience wilder fluctuations (in percentage terms) from month to month than larger, more established airports. Consequently, it was desirable to set a minimum cut-off for inclusion in our final sample. The cut-off used in the regressions that appear below is the requirement that an airport account for at least 0.1 percent of the total passenger count. This leaves 126 airports in the sample, accounting for approximately 95 percent of the total passenger count in January 1990 (the first month in our sample).
To quickly summarize the specifications shown in Table 9 .2, columns 1-3 exclude the supply-side variables (the share of passengers accounted for by non-major airlines and the consumer price index (CPI) adjusted real price of jet fuel), while columns 4-6 include them. Columns 1 and 4 include no time trend variables. Columns 2 and 5 add a general time trend (ending with April 2007). Columns 3 and 6 also allow for the possibility of a break in the time trend after September 11th. The employment level and unemployment rate variables are collected at the state level, with the state-level values applied to each airport within the state. All regressions include airport-and month-specific dummy variables. The standard error estimates allow for prediction errors to be serially correlated at the airport level.
The coefficients on the demand-side economic variables are all of the expected sign. Increases in the log of the employment level are positively linked to air travel, and the coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero in all cases. Increases in the unemployment rate are always negatively linked to the level of air travel, although the coefficients are only statistically significantly different from zero in specifications that do not include a general time trend. When included, the general time trend is significant and always has a coefficient close to 0.002, suggesting an upward trend in air travel of about 0.2 percent per month. When included, the LCC share is positive and statistically significantly different from zero. This is also the case for the price of jet fuel, suggesting that for this variable reverse causality is at work since high fuel prices would normally be expected to negatively impact upon both the supply of and demands for air travel.
It is noteworthy that in these specifications there is a clear difference between the coefficients estimated for the post-September 2001 dummy variable when we do and do not allow for a general time trend. We think that allowance for a general time trend is appropriate, as the log of the employment level is otherwise the only variable used to explain the upward 156 Table 9 .2 Estimates of the impact of 9/11 on air travel using data disaggregated at the airport level To illustrate the effect of 9/11, we created a simple prediction plot. This plot ignores some shift factors, only taking into account the time effects on the natural logarithm of passengers. From Figure 9 .1 you can see the initial drop and then the slow recovery. However, one can see that the post-9/11 trend line never reaches the pre-9/11 trend line.
Large Airport Hypothesis
In this section we present estimates from specifications which explore the hypothesis that passenger traffic through large, hub airports may have 
Figure 9.1 Monthly herfindahl index approach to measuring airport concentration
been more adversely affected by the events of September 11th than passenger traffic through smaller airports. The basis for this hypothesis lies in the fact that areas of high economic and population density make attractive targets for terrorist attacks. Increased perceptions of terrorism risk, the hypothesis goes, will then discourage the use of high-density transportation nodes more than low-density transportation nodes. It may also reduce travel to high-density cities more generally, as these cities are homes to relatively large numbers of high-value potential terrorist targets. In assessing this hypothesis, it is important to account for pre-existing trends and other idiosyncratic characteristics that apply to large airports. It is apparent from looking at the data that large airports have at least been declining in relative importance since prior to September 2001. This can be seen in Figure 9 .1, which plots a monthly Herfindahl Index-style measure of passenger concentration at airports over time. The higher the Herfindahl Index, the more passengers are concentrated at a few airports. As the index drops, passengers are more disaggregated across airports. (The Herfindahl measure is not being used here as an index of 'monopoly' in the usual sense of concentration of firm market power. The shares being used are the shares of passengers using each airport.) Although the index fluctuates fairly significantly over time, there is clearly a decline that takes place around 1999 and 2000. It does, however, appear to have stabilized and even increased somewhat during the months surrounding September 2001. It then drops off substantially and, it would seem, permanently in October 2002. As we move on to the regression results, it should be kept in mind that this concentration index provides a measure of the relative importance of large airports, while the regressions focus on absolute shifts in passenger volumes.
The results shown in Table 9 .3 explore these changes in the relative importance of large airports in a regression context. Fifteen of the 126 airports in the sample are designated as large airports. These airports are not necessarily the traditional hubs of the 'hub-and-spoke' system used by the major airlines over the years. They were selected solely on the basis of the volume of travel flowing through them. This cut-off is based loosely on the airport accounting for at least 2 percent of all passenger traffic in January 1990 (the first month in the sample). The fifteenth airport (Honolulu National Airport), accounted for 1.99 percent of passenger traffic in that month, and is included in part because there is a substantial drop to 1.87 percent to the sixteenth-ranked airport.
To summarize difference across specifications, models 1-3 do not include the two supply-side variables while models 4-7 do. All specifications include a general time trend specific to the large airports (without which September 11th consistently appears to have had an unrealistically large impact on These results suggest that, to the extent that September 11th exerted a differential impact on large airports, it is best captured as a permanent shock to the level of passenger traffic when other factors are held constant.
To illustrate the difference between the large and smaller airports we created Figure 9 .2. In this figure, we can see that large airports have higher levels of passengers on average, this is represented by the higher trend line for large airports. However, the 9/11 shock also causes a larger drop in percentage terms at large airports than at smaller airports. Again, this implies that the initial effect is stronger for large airports. In the longer term, we suggest that large airports could be more affected than smaller airports. This could be the result of higher perceived risk associated with large airports as well as other factors including capacity constraints as large airports become more limited in their expansion. proximity to New York and Washington, DC. In general, East and West Coast airports can also be viewed as serving different markets. This is particularly true with respect to incoming international travelers, as West Coast airports tend to serve travelers from Asia while East Coast airports are more likely to serve passengers from Europe. Although we do not estimate international travel directly, it is possible that international passengers board domestic connection flights after they land at a US destination.
To try and capture this idea in our regression model, we created dummy variables to represent the East Coast and West Coast airports. We then interacted these with our post-9/11 dummy variable. Table 9 .4 depicts the regression results. There does not appear to be any relationship between the regions and the impact of 9/11 as is shown by the insignificance of the interaction terms. However, this could also be due to our data, which focus on domestic travel. International data could see more significant differences between these two regions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have used airport-level data to study the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on domestic air travel in the United States. Our initial estimates of 9/11's effects are similar to those made by Ito and Lee, who used nationally aggregated data in previous work. We have also found evidence suggesting that 9/11 may have had more a adverse impact on large airports than on small airports. This could be the result of 9/11's various impacts (including its impact on risk perceptions and security procedures) being relatively severe in the case of large airports. It is also possible, however, that this result is due to pre-existing trends in the market for air travel. We hope, in future work, to further tease out the extent to which these results can be attributed to 9/11 itself. We found no evidence that East Coast airports were more adversely affected than West Coast airports. We think it is more likely that such an effect would be discernable in data on international passenger traffic. 
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